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RECENT DECISIONS
CHOICE OF LAW-WRONGFUL DEATH-GOVERNMENTAL-INTEREST
ANALYSIS DETERMINES LAW APPLICABLE TO MEASURE OF DAMAGES IN
CLAIMS ARISING FROM FOREIGN Am CRASH

Defendants-the United States,' two American manufacturers, 2
and the foreign national airline3 whose plane had crashed 4-agreed
to a formula among themselves for division of damages. This formula precluded litigation of the issue of liability5 in wrongful death
actions' arising from the March 3, 1974, crash of a McDonnell
Douglas DC-10 near Paris. More than two hundred such suits had
been consolidated in the Central District of California.7 The choice
of law to apply to the assessment of damages was the sole issue left
for settlement or trial. Plaintiffs contended that damages should
be awarded according to the laws of the countries where the vic1. The United States was joined as a defendant under the Federal Tort Claims
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) et seq. (1970). The United States moved to dismiss

plaintiffs' complaints on the contention that 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) precluded suit
against the United States for an accident "arising in a foreign country." The court
denied the motion, reasoning that the acts and omissions alleged in the complaints occurred in California by the wrongful approval, certification as airworthy, and inspection of the plane, rather than where the negligence had its operative effect, i.e. the situs of injury. See Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1
(1962).
2. The DC-10 passenger airplane was designed, constructed, and tested in
California by McDonnell Douglas and General Dynamics (subcontractor for the
fuselage and doors), and owned by Turk Hava Yallari, A.O.
3. Turkish Airlines (Turk Hava Yallari, A.O.).
4. The crash occurred on March 3, 1974, shortly after takeoff from Paris,
France, destroying the Douglas DC-10 and killing all 346 persons aboard, thirteen
of whom were crewmen. The crash followed a depression explosion caused by a
sudden opening of the door leading into the plane's pressurized bulk cargo compartment

which resulted in damage to the control cables under the cabin floor.

5. The court had decided that the law of California and of the United States
would govern the matter of product liability and negligence, as well as all other
grounds of liability.
6. McDonnell Douglas and General Dynamics were present under the Court's
diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. The basis of jurisdiction over Turkish Airlines
was the Federal Tort Claims Act with both pendant and ancillary jurisdiction.
7. There were two hundred and three suits involving three hundred and
thirty-seven decedents arising from the crash. Decedents were from twelve states
of the United States and twenty-four foreign countries. The Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1970), assumed jurisdiction over the various actions (191 of which were initially filed in the instant court)
and consolidated them in the United States District Court for the Central District
of California.
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tims were domiciled at the time of the crash, rather than the law
of California.' The United States District Court for the Central
District of California, held, that the law of California would be
applied to the issue of damages. Governmental interests of the
United States and of the state of California in the design and
manufacture of aircraft were significantly greater than the interest
of any and all other states or nations, such as to require application
of California law to the issue of damages. In re ParisAir Crash of
March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
The traditional choice of law rule for torts has been that of lex
loci delicti, the "law of the place where the wrong took place". 9 Lex
loci is a jurisdiction selecting rule"0 which was intended to excuse
the forum from analyzing policies of the law, the reasons for their
existence, or the effect that application of the law would have upon
the interested parties and states. Whether justified under theories
of comity" or vested rights,"2 the doctrine assumes that the situs
of the wrong always has the greatest interest in its redress. Where
the injury occurs in a jurisdiction other than the jurisdiction where
the wrong giving rise to the injury occurred, the lex loci doctrine
applies the law of the place where the harmful effect or injury first
was felt."3 Various exceptions, however, limit the application of the
8. Plaintiffs advanced arguments that damages should be awarded according
to the laws of the countries where the victims lived at the time of the crash. Other
damage rules suggested were those of: (1) California-which imposes no limits on
death benefits; (2) the domicile of the claimants; (3) France; (4) Japan; and (5)
California plus French "moral" damages. Several Japanese claimants urged application of Japanese law to the Japanese claimants and French law to all others,
including Americans, due to the broader base for calculating damages. The Court
rejected this argument, noting that it would deny defendants the equal protection
of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
9. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 92 (4th ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as

GOODRICH]; see 15A C.J.S. Conflict of Law § 12(2)(b) (1967).
10. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARv. L. Rv. 173,
178 (1933) [hereinafter cited as Cavers].
11. Comity is based on territorial sovereignty and is a result of the lack of
extraterritorial force of a sovereign's laws. A sovereign enforces foreign law as a
courtesy and only when that law does not contravene forum policy. See J. STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 20-38 (3d ed. 1846); GOODRICH § 6.
12. The territorialist theory of vested rights assumed that a right had vested
in the plaintiff and that the law of the place of the tort's commission gave "rise
to an obligation ...

which ...

follows the person, and may be enforced wherever

the person may be found." Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 195 U.S. 120, 126 (1904);
See R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 90 (1968).
13. Dallas v. Whitney, 118 W. Va. 106, 188 S.E. 766 (1936) (Ohio law applied
to govern damages in Ohio resulting from blasting done in West Virginia.)
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lex loci choice of law rule. Under the penal law exception, the
forum court will not enforce the penal laws of a sister state.14 The

public policy exception allows the court of the forum to refuse to
apply the law of the place where the transaction or event occurs if
that law conflicts with the public policy of the forum. 5 Courts also
employed the substance-procedure distinction"6 and the
characterization process.' 7 Despite these complications, the doctrine received considerable impetus when it was adopted by the
original Restatement of Conflict of Laws, in 1934.18 It was argued
that because lex loci seldom requires a law suit to determine
applicable law, it encourages out of court settlements, gives uniform and predictable results, 9 reaffirms stare decisis0 and discourages forum shopping.2' Due to the numerous escape devices
which evolved to allow courts to avoid application of lex loci, these
advantages are no longer certain. Because the exceptions are
result-oriented, and because substance-procedure and characterization carry different meanings in different states, lex loci no
longer gives uniform and predictable results, nor does it discourage
forum shopping. 2 Furthermore, strict application of the doctrine
often produces unjust and anomalous results because it forces the
courts to determine where the injury occurred, mechanically apply
14.
15.

The Antelope, 10 Wheaton 66 (1825).
See generally Paulsen, "Public Policy" in the Conflict of Laws, 56 CoLUmn.

L. REv. 969 (1956).
16. Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal.2d 859, 866, 264 P.2d 944, 949 (1953) (survival
of a cause of action is question of procedure and governed by forum law); see also
Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957) (Court

labeled an issue as one of procedure and then applied law of the forum).
17. If an imaginative court could characterize an issue in tort as an issue in
contract, it could avoid applying the law of the place of the tort. See generally
Lorenzen, The Theory of Qualificationsand the Conflict of Laws, 20 COLUM. L.
REv. 247 (1920).
18. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWs §§ 379, 381, 383-88, 391 (1934).
19. In Friday v. Smoot, 211 A.2d 594, 597 (Del. 1965), the Delaware Supreme
Court stated that "[it may well be that the rule of lex loci delicti in some
instances may appear arbitrary and unfair, but ... it has one positive asset. It
is certain."
20. Abendschein v. Farrell, 382 Mich. 510, 170 N.W.2d. 137 (1969) (stare
decisis followed in action of New York resident against Michigan resident for
wrongful death in Ontario).
21. Beaulieu v. Beaulieu, 265 A.2d 610 (Me. 1970) (Court applied law of
Maine to injuries suffered in Massachusetts accident where both parties were
Maine residents).
22.
LAws

See generally W. COOK,

166 (1942).

THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF
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the law of the situs, and ignore policy considerations.13 Numerous

attacks24 upon lex loci have come from those advocating increased

flexibility and analysis in selecting the applicable law. As the
vested rights approach lost support, 5 the more flexible local law
theory26 arose, allowing the forum to concede that

foreign law is

appropriate but to refuse to apply that law if it is contrary to the
policy of the forum. The advent of the local law theory brought
acceptance of the idea that each state's courts can decide which
laws should govern questions arising from a given transaction.
While less arbitrary than the vested rights and comity theories,2

the local law theory fails to establish guidelines to determine when
lex loci should not govern; in reality, local law is a primitive form
of interest analysis. With this relative freedom to apply different
laws, courts began to substitute more analytical and equitable
approaches for lex loci. A major step in this direction was taken
by the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, which revised its
original position 8 and adopted the approach that the law of the
state having the most significant relationship with the occurrence
and with the parties determines their tort rights and liabilities.2 9
23. Victor v. Sperry, 163 Cal. App. 2d 518, 329 P.2d 728 (1958), graphically
demonstrates the lengths to which this point can be taken. There, a California
resident injured in a collision in Mexico was allowed to recover only a percentage
of two dollars per day for lost wages under Mexican law. The California court said
this Mexican limitation was not contrary to California public policy.
24. A. DicEY, CONFLicTs OF LAWS 937 (7th ed. 1958); Cavers, 178 (1933).
25. As writers and courts recognised that, within constitutional due process
limits, no state is compelled to apply the laws of another state, those rights
previously denominated as "vested" were no longer so considered. For clarification of the approaches adopted by legal scholars and authority for in-depth study
see 47 N.C.L.REv. 407 n.1 (1969).
26. GOODRICH § 6.
27. Cheatham, American Theories of Conflict of Laws: Their Role and Utility,
58 HARV. L. REV. 361, 367 (1945). Opponents argued that comity gave judges too
much discretion in determining whether a foreign law was contrary to forum
policy and that such discretion might run afoul of the full faith and credit clause.
28. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 384 (1934): "(1) If a cause of action
in tort is created at the place of wrong, a cause of action will be recognized in
other states. (2) If no cause of action is created at the place of wrong, no recovery
in tort can be had in any other state."
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 379 (Tent. Draft No. 8,
1969); see Cheatham & Reese, A Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLUM. L. REV.
959 (1952) for a summary of elements affecting choice of law rules:
(1) The needs of the interstate and international systems;
(2) A court should apply its own local law unless there is a good reason for not
doing so;
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This significant alteration in the Restatement provided the impetus for the major shift in judicial thought articulated in the landmark decision of Babcock v. Johnson," in which the law of New
York-where the injured parties resided, the guest-host relationship arose, and the automobile trip began and was to end-rather
than the law of Ontario, as the place of the accident, was applied.
Babcock thereby rejected lex loci in favor of the governmental
interest rule,"' which gives controlling effect to the law of the jurisdiction having the greatest interest in and the most significant
contacts with the specific issue raised in the litigation.2 Among the
increasing number of courts33 adopting the governmental interest
(3) A court should seek to effectuate the purpose of its relevant local law rule in
determining a question of choice of law;
(4) Certainty, predictability, uniformity of result;

(5)Protection of justified expectations;
(6) Application of the law of the state of dominant interest;
(7) Ease in determination of applicable law; convenience of the court;
(8) The fundamental policy underlying broad local law field involved;
(9) Justice in the individual case.
30. Babcock v. Johnson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743
(1963).
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLCT OF LAWS § 145 (Proposed Official
Draft part II):
(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort
are determined by the local law of the state which, as to that issue, has the
most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the
principles stated in § 6.
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to
determine the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred, (b) the place where the conduct
causing the injury occurred, (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place
of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where
the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance
with respect to the particular issue.
32. Babcock v. Johnson, 12 N.Y.2d at 481, 191 N.E.2d at 283, 240 N.Y.S.2d
at 749 (1963). Although the RESTATEMENT approach has been described as involving mainly the number of contacts of an event with a jurisdiction, whereas the
Babcock governmental interest approach is based upon the effect that an event
has upon the jurisdiction, it is probable that the two are so related as to constitute
one approach. See Note, 23 VAND. L. REv. 420, 422 (1970). See, e.g., Wilcox v.
Wilcox, 26 Wis.2d 617, 634, 133 N.W.2d 408, 417 (1965).
33. McSwain v. McSwain, 420 Pa. 86, 215 A.2d 677 (1966); Long v. Pan Am.
World Airways, Inc., 16 N.Y.2d 337, 213 N.E.2d 796, 266 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1965)

(New York court neutral but had jurisdiction); cf. Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines,
9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961) (court, as a matter of public
policy, refused to apply Massachusetts law). See generally B. CurRIE, SELECTED
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approach, the California Supreme Court in Reich v. Purcell" effectively analyzed the interest and policies of each jurisdiction involved. The court analyzed the purpose of the applicable statutes
and then determined which jurisdiction had the greater interest in
the controversy. 5 Consideration of the multiple factors involved in
governmental interest analysis is supplemented in air crash
litigation by the decision of the Supreme Court in Richards v.
United States that aviation injury actions brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act" must be governed by the whole law of the
place where the wrongful act occurred, including its conflict of law
rules, rather than the law of the place where the death or injury
occurred.37 In most aviation crash cases not arising under this Act
the "place of the wrong" is regarded as the state where the plane
fortuitously crashes. The damage limitations imposed by several
states on recoveries for wrongful death in aviation cases demon-

strates the substantial variation in accident recoveries for similar
injuries and for variation even among victims of the same accident
that can occur in applying various choice of law theories.
The instant court" was not faced with the necessity of rejecting
the lex loci delicti rule in favor of the governmental interest approach,4' since that had been accomplished by Reich.2 The court
ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 181-87 (1963); Currie, The Constitutionand the
Choice of Law: GovernmentalInterests and the JudicialFunction, 26 U. CHI. L.
REV. 9 (1958).
34. Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal.2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967) (in
wrongful death action of Ohio residents from collision in Missouri with California
resident, Ohio unlimited recovery law applied rather than Missouri law limiting
recovery to twenty-five thousand dollars).
35. 67 Cal. 2d at 556-57, 432 P.2d at 730-31, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 34-35.
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) et seq. (1970).
37. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962).
38. Paoletto v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 464 F.2d 976 (3d Cir. 1972) (applied law
of the place of injury rather than of the place of the negligence); Quandt v. Beech
Aircraft Corp., 317 F. Supp. 1009 (D. Del. 1970) (applied Italian law).
39. Ten of fifty states have a statutory limitation on recovery for wrongful
death: Colorado, $35,000; Kansas, $35,000; Massachusetts, $50,000; Minnesota,
$35,000; Missouri, $50,000; New Hampshire, $60,000; Oregon, $25,000; Virginia,
$50,000; West Virginia, $110,000; and Wisconsin, $35,500.
40. Peirson M. Hall, Senior District Judge, United States District Court for
the Central District of California.
41. Challoner v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 44 U.S.L.W. 3262 (U.S. Nov.,
1975). (In product liability suit, substantive law of Texas, rather than its conflict
of law rules, applied in diversity action against ammunition manufacturer for
injuries in Cambodia to servicemen from defective howitzer shell).
42. Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967).
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began by recognizing that the three aspects of a cause of action for
wrongful death, i.e. compensation for survivors, deterrence of conduct and assessment of damages, are all primarily local in character. The court found that California has a special interest in deterring tortious conduct of the California defendants present in this
case, avoiding the imposition of excessive financial burden on
these defendants, and assessing uniform damages in order to provide certainty in fulfilling the three components of a wrongful
death action. This certainly is necessary, the court noted, because
"[a]nyone injured throughout the world should be assured that
he can obtain recourse under the law of the state of design or

manufacture."43 Next the court recognized that the United States
has a strong governmental interest in uniform rules, in preemption
over non-uniform regulation, and in aviation commerce. The court
noted that Congress placed aviation in the exclusive and complete
control of the federal government with the passage of the Federal
Aviation Act.44 The court further observed that the United States
also has an equally pervasive and exclusive interest in regulating
the design, manufacture and general "airworthiness" of aircraft
distributed world-wide.4 5 The court recognized that this interest is
clearly expressed in recent decisions of the Supreme Court holding
that federal law should be used where there is a dominant federal
interest.48 In view of this federal interest in air safety and regulation, the court unexpectedly veered from the accustomed awarding
of compensatory damages alone and adopted4 7 and applied the
Supreme Court's recent liberalization 8 of the phrase "pecuniary
43. 399 F. Supp. 732 at 746. For example, had plaintiffs brought their suit in
France or England, a court there would most likely have applied the lex loci
delicti rule. See 2 E. RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A CoMPARATIVE STUDY 235-36
(2d ed. 1958) and the French authorities cited therein. See generally Cavers,
Legislative Choice of Law: Some EuropeanExamples, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 340, 35051 (1971) and the French authorities cited therein.
44. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq. (1970).
45. Id. at §§ 1423(c) and 1506. In the court's view the Act is an expression of
the "clear intent" on the part of Congress to protect against the improper design
and manufacture of aircraft. For a comparison of "airworthiness" with maritime
law see Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970), where a
unanimous Court held that an action for a death resulting from a vessel's unsea-

worthiness is maintainable under general maritime law. See Barbe v. Drummond,
507 F.2d 794 (1st Cir. 1974) (citing Moragne, court found survival action for pain
and suffering).
46.

Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974); Challoner

v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 44 U.S.L.W. 3262 (U.S. Nov., 1975).
47. Under the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652.
48.

Sea-Land Services v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 (1974). The Sea-Land case
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loss" as used in admiralty49 to the measurement of damages to
include love and affection. Thus governmental interests of the
United States and the state of California were such as to require
application of the law of California to the issue of damages along
with adoption of the phrase "pecuniary loss" as used in admiralty.
The importance of the instant decision lies in its application of
governmental interest analysis to wrongful death actions arising
from a mass disaster air crash, and the provocative parallels raised
between current federal aviation law and developments in federal
maritime law.5" The instant court's recognition of the federal interest in aviation commerce" raises the possibility of creating a more
complete body of aviation law that would govern the rights and

duties of injured parties, as well as the measurement of damages.
However, recent legislative attempts to enact comprehensive aviation legislation providing for exclusive federal jurisdiction over
civil damage actions have failed due to congressional unwillingness
to preempt a state's interest in protecting its citizens who have
been injured or are defendants in wrongful death actions. 5 Howspecifically authorizes the recovery of damages for loss of support and contribution, services, society, mental anguish, and funeral expenses in a wrongful death
action under general maritime law.

49. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-68.
50. Note 47 supra. The development of federal maritime laws provides an
intriguing parallel for the development of federal aviation law. Although federal
maritime law is supported by a constitutional grant of admiralty jurisdiction
unlike aviation jurisdiction, little difference exists between the federal interest in
promoting and regulating shipping, and promoting and regulating aviation. To
deny aviation similar treatment (even in the allowance for damages for "pecuniary loss"-which was granted by the Supreme Court in Sea-Land, see note 47
supra) ignores the crucial fact that virtually all commerce moved upon water and
aviation was unsuspected when the United States Constitution was drafted. See
Craig & Alexander, Wrongful Death in Aviation and the Admiralty: Problemsof
Federalism, Tempests, and Teapots,37 J. Am L. & CoM. 3, 18 (1973).
51. The objective of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 is to foster the development of aviation commerce. 49 U.S.C. § 1346 (1970).
52. The "Holtzoff Bill" introduced into the Senate in 1968, provided for exclusive federal jurisdiction over civil actions arising out of the operation of aircraft.
S.3305, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1 (1968). As a result of opposition, the "Admiralty
Bill," patterned after the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-62 (1970),
was introduced, and provided for exclusive federal jurisdiction over any action for
damages from injury or death for any breach of duty arising in the course of

aviation activity. S. 3306, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1 (1968). Due to attacks on the
breadth of the "Admiralty Bill's" provisions, the "Tydings Bill," S.691, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1969) was introduced, limiting federal jurisdiction to those
cases involving substantial numbers of people and suits in multiple jurisdictions.
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ever, application of governmental interest analysis impliedly acknowledges that a state may have legitimate interests other than
that of protecting its own citizens against plaintiffs from outside
the forum state. While each case must be approached on its own
facts and circumstances, the competing and often overlapping interests of federal and state government in particular substantive
rights such as measurement of damages for wrongful death must
be determined by the court. But while governmental interest analysis is clearly the modern trend,53 a large number of courts54 who
are eager to avoid the spectre of ad hoc adjudication continue to
apply lex loci with vigor. The instant decision typifies the unbiased
qualitative analysis of relevant governmental interests required to
enable the newer approach to surpass the lex loci delicti principle
as an equitable and viable instrument for the judiciary. Governmental interest analysis certainly must include consideration of
lex loci among the interests that the particular jurisdiction might
have. But to terminate the analysis upon arrival at lex loci would
condemn the approach to a mechanical and unimaginative emphasis of the fortuity of an incident over which a tortfeasor has little
control. Governmental interest analysis requires that the attention
of the court shift from the quantity of contacts (as with the Restatement of Conflicts of Laws) as being intrinsically meaningful,
and instead focus upon the quality of contacts (as in Babcock)
and the actual issues and facts to determine the extent of each
5
state and nation's interest.
John Edison Drake
53. See cases collected in Annot., 29 A.L.R. 3D 603, 614-15, 623-24 (1970); see
Beaulieu v. Beaulieu, 265 A.2d 610, 615 (Me. 1970) (indicating that appellate
courts having had the opportunity to reevaluate their position have adopted the
modem rule by at least a two to one margin).
54. Haller, Death in the Air: Federal Regulation of Tort Liability a Must, 54
A.B.A.J. 382, 386, n. 14 (1968).
55. The "Choice-Influencing Considerations" approach proposed by Robert
Leflar, see 54 CAL. L. REv. 1584, 1585-88 (1966), consists of five major choiceinfluencing considerations: (1) predictability of results; (2) maintenance of interstate and international order; (3) simplification of the judicial task; (4) advancement of the forum's governmental interests; and (5) application of the "Better
Rule of Law", which incorporates all or most of the factors ordinarily influencing
choice of law decisions. Leflar's method is more comprehensive than governmental interest analysis in that it offers a rational solution to a conflicts situation in
which more than one state has a valid interest, it incorporates governmental
interest analysis, and it encompasses the "most significant relationship" of the
RESTATEMENT 2d.

EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES-FREE MOVEMENT OF WORKERSCOURT OF JUSTICE SETS GUIDELINES FOR USE BY MEMBER STATES OF

48
Plaintiff, Italian national Roland Rutili, was a life-long resident
of France, where he worked and participated in political and trade
union activities.' In mid-1968, the French Minister for the Interior
issued a deportation order against him, which was changed a
month later to an order requiring plaintiff to move from where he
and his family had been living to another part of France.' The
second order was withdrawn by the Minister shortly thereafter. In
1970,3 Rutili's application for a residence permit as a national of a
Member State of the European Economic Community (EEC) was
granted, but with a prohibition on residence in certain areas, including his current home, Audun-le-Tiche. 4 Plaintiff consequently
brought a proceeding before the Administrative Tribunal of Paris
seeking annulment of the territorial limitation on his residence
permit. Not until the actual procedure before the Tribunal did
Rutili learn of the Minister's grounds for the restrictions-that
plaintiff's participation in the 1967 Parliamentary elections campaign and the May 1968 political demonstrations had been the
cause of complaint, and that his presence in the areas in which he
had been living was "likely to disturb public policy," as per article
48(3) of the EEC Treaty (Treaty).- Plaintiff contended before the
Tribunal that the Minister's decision was, inter alia, without legal
justification under Community law, an infringement of the fundaTHE PUBLIC

POLICY EXCEPTION

IN ARTICLE

1. Plaintiff Rutili held a privileged resident's permit. His domicile was
Audun-le-Tiche, a village approximately 250 kilometers east of Paris.

2.

France is divided for administrative purposes into departments. The order

required plaintiff's family to move from the department of Meurthe-et-Moselle
to the department of Puy-de-D4me, approximately 360 kilometers south of Paris.

3. The record is devoid of information concerning what kind of residence
permit plaintiff had between 1968 and 1970. Apparently, he and his family continued to reside in Audun-le-Tiche.
4. This permit was issued under the French Decree on January 5, 1970. Article
6 which states that residence permits "shall be valid throughout French territory

unless otherwise decided in an individual case by the Minister for the Interior on
grounds of public policy." Rutili v. Minister for the Interior, [1975], E.C.R. [Court Decisions 1975 Transfer Binder] CCH Comm. MKT. REP. 8322, at 7781,

- Comm. Mkt. L.R. - (1975) [hereinafter cited as Rutili].
5. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (EEC), entered
into force Jan. 1, 1958, 298 U.N.T.S. 3. The authoritative English text of the
Treaty may be found in Treaties Establishingthe EuropeanCommunities (Office
of Official Publications of the European Communities, 1973) [hereinafter cited
as EEC Treaty].
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mental right of freedom of movement of workers under article 48

of the Treaty,6 and a violation of the principle of nondiscrimination under article 7 of the Treaty.7 The Administrative
Tribunal decided to stay its proceeding pursuant to article 1778 of

the Treaty until the European Court of Justice could make a preliminary ruling on the Common Market issues involved.' The
6. Id. Article 48 provides:
(1) The free movement of workers shall be ensured within the Community
not later than at the date of the expiration of the transitional period.
(2) This shall involve the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member States as regards employment, remuneration, and other working conditions.
(3) It shall include the right, subject to limitations justified by reasons of
public policy, public safety and public health:
(a) to accept offers of employment actually made;
(b) to move about freely for this purpose within the territory of
Member States;
(c) to stay in any Member State in order to carry on an employment
in conformity with the legislative and administrative provisions governing the employment of the workers of that State; and
(d) to live, on conditions which shall be the subject of implementing
regulations to be laid down by the Commission, in the territory of a
Member State after having been employed there.
(4) The provisions of this Article shall not apply to employment in the
public administration.
7. Id. Article 7 provides:
Within the field of application of this Treaty and without prejudice to the
special provisions mentioned therein, any discrimination on the grounds of

nationality shall hereby be prohibited.
The Council may, acting by means of a qualified majority vote on a
proposal of the Commission and after the Assembly has been consulted, lay
down rules in regard to the prohibition of such discrimination.
8. Id. Article 177 provides:
The Court of Justice shall be competent to make a preliminary decision
concerning:
(a) the interpretation of this Treaty;
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community; and
(c) the interpretation of the statutes of any bodies set up by an act of the
Council, where such statutes so provide.
Where any such question is raised before a court or tribunal of one of the
Member States, such court or tribunal may, if it considers that its judgment
depends on a preliminary decision on this question, request the Court of
Justice to give a ruling thereon.
Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a domestic
court or tribunal from whose decisions no appeal lies under municipal law,
such court or tribunal shall refer the matter to the Court of Justice.
9. The two questions submitted by the Tribunal were: (1) "Does the expres-
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Court of Justice held that the limitations on the use of the public
policy exception to freedom of movement of workers found in article 48(3) of the Treaty apply to decisions involving individual alien
workers, and designated guidelines for the proper utilization of this
exception by Member States. 0 Rutili v. Ministerfor the Interior,
8322,
2 CCH Comm. Mkt. Rep.
[19751 E.C.R. -,
Comm. Mkt. L.R. - (1975).
The concept of free movement of workers within the Community
and the valid public policy exception to that concept as embodied
in article 48 of the Treaty have been explained and interpreted by
a number of directives, regulations and cases that provided the
base upon which the guidelines produced in the instant case were
built. Council Directive No. 64/221, article 3(1) provides that measures taken by a national government on public policy grounds
must be based only on the personal conduct of the individual in
each case." This directive also sets procedural standards for the
sion 'subject to limitations justified on grounds of public policy' used in Article

48 of the Treaty Establishing the EEC concern merely the legislative decisions
which each Member State of the EEC has decided to take in order to limit within
its territory the freedom of movement and residence for nationals of other Member States or does it also concern individual decisions taken in application of such
legislative decisions?" (2) "What is the precise meaning to be attributed to the
word 'justified'?"
10. The public policy guidelines set by the Court were as follows:
(1) Measures restricting freedom of movement of workers taken by a
Member State on the public policy ground must be weighed in light of all
existing Community rules that limit the discretionary power of Member
States to utilize this ground, and that ensure the protection of rights of
those persons subject to the restrictive measures;
(2) Any restrictive measure taken by a Member State must be based
exclusively on the personal conduct of the individual worker concerned;
(3) No restrictive measure can be taken that serves a purpose unrelated
to the requirements of public policy;
(4) No restrictive measures can be taken that limits properly exercised
trade union rights;
(5) A Person against whom a restrictive measure has been taken must be
informed immediately of the reasons for the measure, so that he may make
effective use of his legal remedies.
Rutili, at 7779-80.
11. Council Directive No. 64/221, article 3(1) provides:
Measures taken on grounds of public policy or of public security shall be
based exclusively on the personal conduct of the individual concerned.
[1964] Official Journal of the European Communities 118 [hereinafter cited as
[1964] J.O.]. (Article 189 of the EEC Treaty provides that "Directives shall bind
any Member State to which they are addressed, as to the result to be achieved,
while leaving to domestic agencies a competence as to form and means.").

654

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol 9: 651

application of the public policy exception to the free movement
concept. It provides for notification of the grounds on which the
restrictive ruling is based, and right of defense before a competent
authority." Council Directive No. 68/360, article 6(1)(a) states that
any residence permit granted to a Community worker must be

valid throughout the Member States.'3 Council Regulation No.

1612/68, article 8 requires that Community workers have equality
of treatment in union membership and equal opportunity to exercise trade union rights." In the Van Duyn case, the Court of Justice
held that both article 48 of the Treaty and article 3(1) of Directive
64/221 are directly applicable to free movement cases without implementing legislation by Member States, thus conferring upon
individuals rights that the national courts must protect,' 5 and re12. Directive 64/221, articles 6 and 9 provide:
The person concerned shall be informed of the grounds of public policy,
public security, or public health upon which the decision taken in his case
is based, unless this is contrary to the interests of the security of the State
involved.
Where there is no right of appeal to a court of law, or where such appeal
may be only in respect of the legal validity of the decision, or where the
appeal cannot have suspensory effect, a decision refusing renewal of a residence permit or order the expulsion of the holder of a residence permit

from the territory shall not be taken by the administrative authority, save
in cases of urgency, until an opinion has been obtained from a competent
authority of the host country before which the person concerned enjoys such
rights of defence and of assistance or representation as the domestic law of
that country provides.
[1964] J.O. 118.
13. Council Directive No. 68/360, article 6(1)(a) provides:
(1) The residence permit:
(a) must be valid throughout the territory of the issuing Member
State;
[1968] J.O. 485, 1 CCH Comm. Mkt. Rep. 1035F.
14. Council Regulation No. 1612/68, article 8 provides:
A worker who is a national of one Member State and employed in the
territory of another Member State shall be entitled to equal treatment with
respect to membership in labor unions and the exercise of union rights,
including the right to vote; he may be excluded from taking part in the
administration of the government organizations and from exercising a governmental function. He shall, in addition, be eligible to hold office in organizations.
[19681 J.O. 475, 1 CCH Comm. Mkt. Rep.
1031H (article 189 of the EEC
Treaty provides that "Regulations shall have a general application. They shall
be binding in every respect and directly applicable to each Member State.").
15. The rights determined by the Court to be enjoyed by individuals include
the prohibition of discrimination against workers based on nationality, and the
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quiring that the public policy exception be strictly interpreted.',
The need for strict interpretation was echoed by the Court the
following year in the Bonsignore case.' 7 In that case, the "personal
conduct" rule of article 3(1) of Directive 64/221 was defined to
require that restrictive action cannot be taken by a Member State
under the public policy exception for reasons of a "general preventive nature." 8 As the Court in the instant case points out, these
directives, regulations and cases are an application of the general
principle of non-discrimination, found in article 7 of the Treaty
and articles 8-11 of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, to the specific topic
of the freedom of movement of Community workers.' 9
In the instant case, the Court of Justice focuses upon the explication of the public policy exception. First, in deciding whether the
limitations to the public policy exception apply to individual decisions, the Court ruled that the proper use of the public policy
requirement that restrictive measures taken on public policy grounds be based
exclusively on the personal conduct of the individual concerned. Supra notes 6 &
11; Van Duyn v. Home Office, [1974] E.C.R. 1337, [Court Decisions 1975
Transfer Binder] CCH Comm. Mkt. Rep.
8283, 12 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 109
(1975). In this case, plaintiff, a Dutch national, was refused leave to enter the
United Kingdom for the purpose of taking employment as a secretary with the
Church of Scientology at its college in England. The Immigration officer refusing
entry did so on the basis of the nation's Immigration Act of 1971, section 4(1),

which permits exclusion where it is conducive to the public good.
16. "It should be emphasized thatthe concept of public policy in the context
of the Community and where, in particular, it is used as a justification for derogating from the fundamental principle of freedom of movement for workers,
must be interpreted strictly, so that its scope cannot be determined unilaterally
by each Member State without being subject to review by the institutions of the
Community. Id. at 7227.
17. Bonsignore v. Overstadtdirektor of Cologne [1975] E.C.R. 297, [Court
Decisions 1975 Transfer Binder] Comm. Mkt. Rep.P 8298, Comm. Mkt.
L.R.
- (1975) [hereinafter cited as Bonsignore]. In this case, plaintiff, an
Italian national residing and working in Germany, was ordered deported after
being convicted of negligent homicide. The order was issued pursuant to a German law providing for deportation for reasons of public policy.
18. A restrictive measure taken under the aegis of the public policy exception
cannot be taken by a Member State for the purpose of deterring similar conduct
by other foreign nationals in the future. Rather, there must be a "special
preventive nature," i.e. the action can be validly taken through use of the public
policy exception only where it is necessary against the particular individual's
future conduct. Id. at 7483.
19. Rutili 7778. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (1955) (articles 8-11 provide for individual freedoms).
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exception applies not only to legislative measures taken by Member States to limit freedom of movement,"° but also to decisions
based on that legislation that affects ths movement of individual
workers. The Court arrived at this view by looking to: (1) the
holding in the Van Duyn case that article 48 of the Treaty and its
implementing Directive 64/221 confer rights directly on nationals
of Member States; (2) article 3 of Directive 64/221 and the ruling
in the Bonsignore case that measures taken by national governments on the ground of public policy be based only on the personal
conduct of the individual alien worker concerned; and (3) the necessary availability of judicial review of the exercise of discretionary
power by national authorities.2" Secondly, as to what is the precise
meaning of the word "justified", found in article 48(3) of the
Treaty, the Court defined public policy standards in terms of substance, procedure and discrimination. In order to determine
whether there is a sufficiently serious threat to public policy, 2 the
Court turned its attention to articles 2 2 and 324 of Directive 64/221,
article 8 of Regulation 1612/68, 25 and the European Human Rights
Convention 2 to determine the substantive guidelines set forth in
20. See, e.g., French Decree of January 5, 1970, Rutili.
21. "This conclusion is based in equal measure on due respect for the rights
of the nationals of Member States, which are directly conferred by the Treaty and
by Regulation No. 1612/68, and the express provision in article 3 of Directive No.
64/221 which requires that measures taken on grounds of public policy or public

security "shall be based exclusively on the personal conduct of the individual
concerned." This view of the matter is all the more necessary inasmuch as national legislation on the protection of public policy and security usually reserve
to the national authorities discretionary powers which might escape all judicial
review if the courts were unable to extend their examination to individual decisions taken pursuant to the reservation contained in article 48(3) of the Treaty."
Rutili 7777.
22.

".

.

. restrictions cannot be imposed on the right of a national of any

Member State to enter the territory of another Member State, to stay there and
to move within it unless his presence or conduct constitutes a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to public policy." Rutili 7777-7778.
23. Council Directive 64/221, article 2 provides:
(1) This Directive relates to all measures concerning entry into their territory, issue or renewal of residence permits, or expulsion from their territory,
taken by Member States on grounds of public policy, public security or
public health.
(2) Such grounds shall not be invoked to service economic needs.
[1964] J.O. 118.
24. Council Directive 64/221, art. 3(1), [1964] J.O. 118.
25. Council Directive 68/360, art. 6(1)(a), [1968] J.O. 485.
26. Materials cited note 19 supra.
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this opinion, finding that: (1) measures restricting freedom of
movement of workers must be weighed in light of all Community
rules that limit a Member State's discretion in using this ground,
and that ensure the protection of rights of those persons subject to
the restrictive measures; (2) restrictive measures must be based
solely on the personal conduct of the individual worker involved;
(3) restrictive measures may not serve a purpose unrelated to the
requirements of public policy; and (4) no measure may restrict
properly exercised trade union rights.Y For procedural guidelines,
the Court looked to articles 6, 8 and 9 of Directive 64/221,2 finding
that both notice to the individual of the public policy grounds that
form the basis for the restrictions on movement taken against him,
and the right to appeal the imposition of those restrictions are re-

quired. 2 The Court then considered the existence of discrimina-

30
tion, finding through an interpretation of article 48 of the Treaty
and Directive 68/3601 that public policy limitations on residence
under article 48(3) of the Treaty 2 can apply only with respect to
the whole of the state. 3 Hence, the Court found, a partial territorial restriction on residence, as imposed on plaintiff in the instant case, must come under the scrutiny of the nondiscrimination provision of article 7 of the Treaty. 34 A Member
State cannot impose such a restriction upon foreign workers "exwhere such prohibitions may be imposed on
cept in circumstances
'35
its own nationals.

27. Rutili 7777-7780.
28. Council Directive 64/221, arts. 6, 9 [1964] J.O. 118.
29. "It is clear ... that any person . . . must be entitled to a double safeguard comprising notification to him of the grounds on which any restrictive
measure has been adopted in his case and the availability of a right of appeal."
Rutili 7778.
30. EEC Treaty art. 48.
31. Council Directive 68/360, art. 6(1)(a), [1968] J.O. 485.
32. EEC Treaty art. 48.
33. "The right of entry into the territory of the Member States and the right
to stay there and to move freely within it is defined in the Treaty by reference to

the whole territory of these States and not by reference to its internal subdivisions. The reservation contained in article 48(3) concerning the protection of
public policy has the same scope as the rights whose exercise may, under that
paragraph, be subject to limitations. It follows that prohibitions on residence

under the reservation inserted to this effect in article 48(3) may be imposed only
in respect of the whole of the national territory. Rutili 7779.
34. EEC Treaty art. 7.
35. Seemingly contra is part of the Van Duyn ruling in which the Court
allowed treatment of the foreign national different from that of a citizen. How-
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As Advocate General Mayras points out in the instant case,
Rutili takes its place in line after Van Duyn and Bonsignore, and
allows the Court to "define more clearly the outlines of the concept
of public policy contained in article 48(3) of the Treaty."36 The
concept of freedom of movement of workers, and the prohibition
of discrimination on the basis of nationality of workers are both
essential to the realization of a true economic community that is
mindless of political borders. While derogation from those fundamental principles through the article 48(3) public policy exception
should be allowed at the discretion of Member States, which are

themselves best able to determine when it is necessary, that discretion must be strictly limited to its valid uses. The Court's discus-

sion of the use of the public policy exception in the instant case
goes a long way in providing tangible, clear-cut guidelines and
criteria to be used by Member States' national courts in reviewing
the validity of administrative acts taken under article 48(3) of the
Treaty. In the instant case, the application of the Court's delineated standards by the Administrative Tribunal of Paris to the facts
of Rutili's case may lead to the striking down of the territorial
restriction on his residence permit. This is particuarly possible if
the French Minister for the Interior actually made the restriction
to prevent Rutili from continuing to engage in valid political and
trade union activities in his hometown, or to discourage other resident foreign workers from doing the same. The future may well
bring continued strengthening and specification, by the European
Court of Justice, of Council regulations and directives implementing article 48 of the Treaty, so that a Member State will no longer
be able to invoke the public policy ground merely to harass and
rid itself of an "undesirable", trouble-making alien worker who is
a citizen of the European Economic Community, in contravention of his basic Treaty right of free movement.
Heidi A. Rohrbach
ever, there it was found that the restriction made did fit within article 48(3) of
the Treaty. Rutili 7228.
36. Rutili 7780.
37.

".

.

. the freedom of movement of workers ... [and] . . .the right to

reside and to be employed in the host State . . . are individual rights that are
essential to the realization of the Common Market which, far from being limited
to the unhindered trade in goods, necessarily involves individual mobility and
guaranteed access to the territory of each Member State for the purpose of

employment there." Bonsignore 7488.
38. See comments by Advocate General Mayras (undesirable aliens). Id. at
7490.

TAX TREATIES-UNITED

STATES MAY USE THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SUMMONSING AUTHORITY TO OBTAIN DOMESTIC INFORMATION SOLELY TO AID A FOREIGN DOMESTIC TAX INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO A TAX TREATY

Canadian tax authorities requested American assistance with
their investigation of the potential Canadian tax liability of Westward Shipping Ltd., a Canadian corporation that is neither a
United States resident nor taxpayer. The request was made pursuant to the Income Tax Treaty of 1942 between the United States
and Canada' (Treaty), which provides for exchange of information2 to aid in the prevention of tax evasion. In order to obtain
the requested information the United States Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) issued administrative summonses to appellees Bank
of Tokyo and A.L. Burbank & Co., 3 both located in New York

1. Convention and Protocol with Canada respecting Double Taxation, March
4, 1942, 56 Stat. 1399; T.S. No. 983. There have been several revisions of the
Treaty, none of which affect the issue in this case: Supplementary Convention,
June 12, 1950, [1951] 2 U.S.T. 2235, T.I.A.S. No. 2347; Supplementary Conven-

tion, Aug. 8, 1956, [1957] 2 U.S.T. 1619, T.I.A.S. No. 3916; Supplementary
Convention, Oct. 25, 1966, [1967] 3 U.S.T. 3186, T.I.A.S. No. 6415.

The exchange of information provisions are:
Article XIX:
With a view to the prevention of fiscal evasion, each of the contracting
States undertakes to furnish to the other contracting State, as provided in
the succeeding Articles of this Convention, the information which its competent authorities have at their disposal or are in a position to obtain under
its revenue laws in so far as such information may be of use to the authorities of the other contracting State in the assessment of the taxes to which
this Convention relates.
The information to be furnished under the first paragraph of this article,
whether in the ordinary course or on request, may be exchanged directly
between the competent authorities of the two contracting States.
Article XXI:
1. If the Minister in the determination of the income tax liability of any
person under any of the revenue laws of Canada deems it necessary to
secure the cooperation of the Commissioner, the Commissioner may, upon
request, furnish the Minister such information bearing upon the matter as
the Commissioner is entitled to obtain under the revenue laws of the United
States of America.
2. If the Commissioner in the determination of the income tax liability
of any person under any of the revenue laws of the United States of America
deems it necessary to secure the cooperation of the Minister, the Minister
may, upon request, furnish the Commissioner such information bearing
upon the matter as the Minister is entitled to obtain under the revenue laws
of Canada.
3. According to the District's Court's opinion in this case, United States v.
2.
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City, requiring them to produce books and records that were relevant to the Canadian investigation. The IRS cited its summons
and examination authority found in the 1954 Internal Revenue
Code (IRC) section 7602.1 Westward filed written objections with
the IRS to contest the disclosure of information solely to be turned
over to a foreign country; it contended that the summonses were
not authorized by the Treaty nor the IRC. The IRS did not seek
to enforce its summonses, but instead issued a new summons requesting from Burbank the same information as was previously
solicited, but claimed to require it in respect of Burbank's domestic tax liability. Westward obtained an order in United States district court' on an application to quash this new summons. This
proceeding led to a stipulation among the parties that Burbank
would be stayed from complying with the last summons until the
United States Government should move for enforcement. The
Government decided instead to enforce the original summonses in
the instant proceeding. The district court held6 that the summonA.L. Burbank, 34 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 74-5762 (1974), the summons to Bank of
Tokyo referred to nothing more than the American tax liability of Westward,
while the summons to Burbank states: "For Information Required Pursuant to
the Provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and Article 19 of the Income
Tax Treaty Between Canada and the United States." 34 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d at
74-5763.
4. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7602:
Examination of books and witnesses.
For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a
return where none has been made, determining the liability of any person
for any internal revenue tax or the liability at law or in equity of any
transferee or fiduciary of any person in respect of any internal revenue tax,
or collecting any such liability, the Secretary or his delegate is authorized(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be
relevant or material to such inquiry;
(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform the
act, or any officer or employee of such person, or any person having possession, custody, or care of books of account containing entries relating to the
business of the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any
other person the Secretary or his delegate may deem proper, to appear
before the Secretary or his delegate at a time and place named in the
summons and to produce such books, papers, records, or other data, and
to give such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such
inquiry; and
(3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under oath, as may
be relevant or material to such inquiry.
5. U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, which subsequently
heard the instant case.
6. 34 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d at 74-5762. This discussion is concerned only with

the central issue of the legality of the summonses. The peripheral issues, the
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ses were illegal because there is no authority in the Treaty or the
IRC for issuance of an IRS summons solely for the purpose of

aiding Canadian tax authorities in a Canadian tax investigation.
On appeal to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, held, affirmed

in part and reversed in part. When an American tax treaty provides for exchange of information between cosignatories, the IRS
may use its summons authority to obtain information from

American-based corporations for use in a foreign tax investigation
although there is no United States interest in the investigation and
no claim that United States income taxes are potentially due and
owing. United States v. A.L. Burbank & Co., Ltd., 525 F.2d 9 (2d
Cir. 1975).

A treaty, like the Constitution and the federal laws, is the supreme law of the land. 7 If a treaty and a federal statute conflict,

the later of the two overrides the earlier act.' However, courts will
always attempt to construe two acts to give effect to both of them
if possible? Repeal by implication is not favored;10 specifically, the
intent of Congress to abrogate a treaty by a subsequent statute
must be clearly expressed.' Thus proper construction of each of

the acts in question is crucial to resolving conflicts between the
two, and treaty interpretation has been the object of extensive
study.'2 Ascertaining the intent of the parties is the primary objecrenewed opposition by Burbank and Bank of Tokyo and the unsuccessful intervention by Westward, have been omitted.
7. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2:
"This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land ....

.

8. Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884) (a treaty is superseded by a
federal statute only to the extent of its domestic effect. The treaty remains in
force as an international obligation). 5 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
185, 194-95 (1943).

9.

Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974) (two conflicting federal stat-

utes); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1887) (conflict between treaty and
federal statute).
10. Universal Interpretive Shuttle Corp. v. Metropolitan Area Transit
Comm'n, 393 U.S. 186, 193 (1968); Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536,
549 (1884) (both restating the established principle of law).
11. United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939) (the intention of
Congress "must be clear and manifest"); Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102,
120 (1933).
12. For excellent examples of criteria used for treaty interpretation, see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§

146, 147 (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT]; Vienna Convention of the
Law of Treaties, art. 31-32, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, May 23, 1969 as reported
in 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875, 885 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Vienna Convention].
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tive of treaty interpretation and the Supreme Court has consistently advocated liberal construction of treaty language to best
determine intended rights and obligations of the consignatories. 13
Although the parties generally desire equality and reciprocity be-

tween them, the United States abides by its own construction of
each convention notwithstanding its cosignor's possible analysis to
the contrary.' 4 Full treaty status is accorded to tax treaties, assuming that they are self-executing.' 5 There is some question, however,

whether tax treaties are self-executing or executory. 1 Final. determination of this question is a matter of judicial interpretation"
and there is some case authority supporting the self-executing status of tax treaties. 8 It has also been suggested that this question
13.

Bacardi Corp. v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150, 163 (1940) (" . . . we should

construe the treaty liberally to give effect to the purpose which animates it");
Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 293 (1933) (Treaty "obligations should be
liberally construed so as to effect the apparent intention of the parties to secure
equality and reciprocity between them"); see CHANG, THE INTERPRETATION OF
TREATIES BY JUDICIAL TRIBUNALS, ch. VII (1968 ed. 1933).
14. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 298 (1933); Charlton v. Kelly, 299
U.S. 447, 473 (1913). Even if the failure to reciprocate is deemed a material breach
of the treaty obligation instead of a contrary interpretation, according to international law the treaty is considered only voidable by the complying party and
unilateral adherence may continue. See, e.g., Vienna Convention, art. 60.
15. A treaty is self-executing if it is made on behalf of the United States and
manifests an intention that it shall become effective as domestic law of the United
States at the same time it becomes binding on the United States. An executory
treaty requires congressional action for implementation. See RESTATEMENT § 141
and comment (a). With respect to a treaty and an act of legislation, "if the two
are inconsistent, the one last in date will control the other, provided always the
stipulation of the treaty on the subject is self-executing." Whitney v. Robertson,
124 U.S. 190, 194 (1887).
16. See Brecher, Relationship of, and Conflicts Between Income Tax Treaties
and the Internal Revenue Code, 24 TAX ExEc. 175, 182 (1971-72) [hereinafter
cited as Brecher] (assuming that tax treaties are self-executing); Statement by
Mitchell B. Carroll, Special Tax Consultant to the National Foreign Trade Council, at Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. of Foreign Relations U.S.
Senate, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., at 27-28. reproduced in 1 LEG. HIsT. OF U.S. TAX
CONY. 535-36 (1962) (assuming that tax treaties are not self-executing).

17.

"Whether an international agreement of the United States is or is not self-

executing is finally determined as a matter of interpretation by courts in the
United States if the issue arises in litigation." RESTATEMENT § 154(1).
18. See Brecher, at 179-83. Brecher cites, for example, American Trust Co. v.
Smyth, 247 F.2d 149, 153 (9th Cir. 1957) rev'g 141 F. Supp. 414, and Georges
Simenon, 44 T.C. 820, 835 (1965), both of which determined that the respective
tax treaties being scrutinized were the supreme law of the land. However, no

distinction was drawn in either case between self-executing and executory treaties.
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has been made moot by the enactment of the 1954 IRC which
appears to provide the necessary legislative implementation.' 9 IRC
section 7852(d) provides that "[n]o provision of this title shall
apply in any case where its application would be contrary to any
treaty obligation of the United States in effect on the date of enactment of this title." 0 In the instant case, the "treaty obligation" is
the furnishing to a cosignatory of information which each party
is in a position to obtain under its respective revenue laws. " The
IRC "provision" referred to in section 7852(d) is, in the instant
case, section 7602, which directs the IRS's summonsing and
examination authority to the determination of liability "for any
internal revenue tax" (emphasis supplied).2" These words could
be construed as language of limitation, " restricting the use of
summons and examination to determination of American tax liability. The IRS acquiesced to Canadian limitations on the application of the exchange of information provision when, in prescribing in its Manual' the proper method to request information from
Canada about a Canadian taxpayer, it states that "Canadian tax
authorities are authorized to furnish only that information which
they can obtain under the revenue laws of Canada." Variance
19. Brecher suggests this possibility based upon §§ 894(a) and 7852(d) of the
IRC. § 7852(d) will be discussed in the text. Id. at 179.
20. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7852(d). The 1954 IRC was enacted on August
16, 1954.
21. See note 2 supra. The court addressed the problem which arose when the
IRS summonsed the information by implementation of its statutory power. Another related issue is whether the IRS is compelled by the Treaty to obtain this
information. The language employed by this Treaty with respect to the agreement
to supply information upon request is permissive, unlike many other American
tax treaties. See King, Fiscal Cooperation in Tax Treaties, 26 TAXES 889, 893
(1948). Similarly, the regulations which accompany this Treaty illustrate the
nonobligatory nature of the Canadian-American agreement to exchange information in specific cases. The IRS Commissioner "may" furnish requested information to the Canadian Minister. Reg. § 519.120, 1 CCH TAX TREATmS (1967) 1254
(T.D. 5206). In contrast, article XX of our original Income Tax Treaty with the
United Kingdom is an example of a mandatory provision as interpreted by the
accompanying regulation which states that the Commissioner "shall" furnish
such information. Reg. § 507.121, 2 CCH TAX TREATIEs (1966) 8151 (T.D. 5569).

This issue, however, became moot as soon as the IRS decided to comply with the
Canadian request.
22. The regulation uses the same words. Treas. Reg. § 301.7602 (1959) as
amended T.D. 7297 (1973).
23. It was considered as such by the district court. 34 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d at
74-5765.
24. 4 CCH INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL (1975).
25. Id. § 9265.2(3).
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between the two parties with respect to the obtainability of information could lead to a conflict about reciprocity. Notwithstanding
the general American position on reciprocity of treaty obligation
to the contrary, the report of the Acting Secretary of State laying
the convention before President Roosevelt explained that the
Treaty's exchange of information articles were to be administered
on a reciprocal basis. " Thus there is a conflict between case law
doctrine and the specific facts in this case. These conflicts of law
7
and fact present a question of first impression in this country:
whether the United States, as party to a tax treaty which is reliant
upon the IRS for enforcement, may use the IRC summonsing
power to obtain domestic information solely to aid a foreign domestic tax investigation.

In the instant case the court agreed with the district court that
the Treaty does not provide independent compulsory process for
obtaining information but depends instead upon IRC section 7602
for implementation. The court did not agree, however, with the
lower court's conclusion that the phrase in section 7602-"for any
internal revenue tax"-should be read so narrowly as to disallow
the issuance of an IRS summons solely to aid a Canadian domestic
tax investigation. Since the avowed intent of the cosignatories was
to provide cooperative exchange of information to prevent tax evasion, the court believed that to require concurrent tax liability in
both states for valid exercise of the IRS's summons and examination authority would totally frustrate the Treaty. The court recognized that other American tax treaties with comparable exchange
of information provisions would also be frustrated by such a narrow
reading.28 In addition to calling for the full use of the section 7602
investigative tools, the court advocated broad construction of the
Treaty. The court said that liberal interpretation of treaties is a
well-settled rule and is essential to the enforcement of the parties'
intent. The court then noted that even if section 7602 were as
narrow as appellees Burbank and Bank of Tokyo contended, section 7852(d), enacted after the Treaty, would render section 7602
26. "By means of these articles [XIX, XX, XXI], there will be obtained by
the United States, upon a reciprocal basis, (a) information on a comprehensive

scale with respect to income derived by residents of the United States from
Canadian sources and (b) information in the case of specific taxpayers with respect to whom information is available in Canada." Report of Sumner Welles,
Acting Secretary of State, to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, March 6, 1942,
reproduced in 1 LEG. HIST. OF U.S. TAX CoNv. 449 (1962).
27. United States v. A.L. Burbank & Co., Ltd., 525 F.2d 9, 11 (2d Cir. 1975).

28. 525 F.2d at 12-13.
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unenforceable. 29 The court then turned to specific arguments of the
appellees. The appellees urged that great weight be given to the
Treaty's practical construction,"0 that is, the meaning given by the
department of government particularly concerned with the Treaty.
They cited the Internal Revenue Manual with its implicit acquiescence to Canada's revenue law limitations upon information
obtainment. The court, however, concluded that the record did not
establish this as the official Canadian position, but, even if it were
so, Canada's position would not represent the American interpretation. According to the Government, the position it argues in the
instant case is consistent with its position in the past, and has
never been challenged. The court saw nothing in the record to
contradict the Government's representation.3 ' The appellees readdressed themselves to the Manual provision and claimed that
since reciprocity of exchange of information was intended, then a
burden that is greater on the United States than on Canada is inconsistent with this intention. The court refuted this argument by
citing precedents holding that even though a treaty has ceased to
be reciprocal the treaty must either be denounced or adhered to
32
according to the obligations originally required by the treaty.
Thus, concludes the court, the Canadian interpretation is not relevant. 3 3 Finally, the court directed itself to the model income tax
treaty drafted by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) 31 of which Canada and the United States
are members. The appellees asserted that the exchange of infor29. 525 F.2d at 14.
30. "While courts interpret treaties for themselves, the meaning given them
by the departments of government particularly charged with their negotiation
and enforcement is given great weight." Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194
(1960). See also Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 295-96 (1933).
31. 525 F.2d at 15.
32. The court cited Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913) and Factor v.
Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933). 525 F.2d at 15.
33. See also note 14 supra.
34.

ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION & DEVELOPMENT, DRAFT DOUBLE

TAXATION CONVENTION ON INCOME AND CAPITAL (1963), reprinted in

1

CCH TAX

151. The Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC)
created its Fiscal Committee in 1956 to study fiscal questions with respect to
TREATIES

double taxation. The OEEC became the OECD in December 1960, as Canada
and the United States joined the previous eighteen members. The Fiscal Committee continued and, after issuing four study reports, produced the model treaty.
Kragen, Double Income Taxation Treaties: The O.E. C.D. Draft,52 CALIF. L. REV.
306, 308 (1964).
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mation article 35 of this Draft Convention subordinates any treaty
requirements to the laws and administrative practice of each cosignatory and that the United States intended to adapt the provisions
in their tax treaties to the provisions in the Draft Convention. The
Government introduced the Draft Convention's Revised Commentary,3" which authorized special investigations and use of adminis35. Art. 26 provides:
2. In no case shall the provisions of paragraph 1 be construed so as to

impose on one of the Contracting States the obligation:
(a) to carry out administrative measures at variance with the laws or the
administrative practice of that or of the other Contracting State;
(b) to supply particulars which are not obtainable under the laws or in the
normal course of the administration of that or of the other Contracting
State;
(c) to supply information which would disclose any trade, business, industrial, commercial or professional secret or trade process, or information,
the disclosure of which would be contrary to public policy (ordre public).
36. The pertinent provisions of the Revised Commentary are quoted in the
opinion:
12. This paragraph (Paragraph 2 of the Model Treaty) embodies certain
limitations to the main rule in favor of the requested State. In the first
place, the paragraph contains the clarification that a Contracting State is
not bound to go beyond its own internal laws and administrative practice
in putting information at the disposal of the other Contracting State.
However, types of administrative measures authorized for the purpose of
the requested State's tax must be utilized even though invoked solely'to
provide information to the other ContractingState. Likewise, internal provisions concerning tax secrecy should not be interpreted as constituting an
obstacle to the exchange of information under the present Article. As mentioned above, the authorities of the requesting State are obliged to observe
secrecy with regard to information received under this Article.
14. Information is deemed to be obtainable in the normal course of administration if it is in the possession of the tax authorities or can be obtained
by them in the normal procedure of tax determination, which may include
special investigations or special examination of the business accounts kept
by the taxpayer or other persons provided the tax authoritieswould make
similar investigationsor examination for their own purposes. This means
that the requested State has to collect the informationthe other State needs
in the same way as if its own taxation was involved, under the proviso
mentioned in paragraph 13 above. 525 F.2d at 16 (emphasis supplied).

According to a case footnote, the appellees introduced paragraph 13 at oral argument in answer to paragraphs 12 and 14. Also in this note the court quoted the
paragraph and dismissed it. Paragraph 13 reads:
13. Furthermore the Requested State does not need to go so far as to carry
out administrative measures that are not permitted under the laws or practice of the requesting State or to supply items of information that are not

obtainable under the laws or in the normal course of administration of the
requesting State. It follows that a Contracting State cannot take advantage
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trative tools to be employed by each state for its own purposes,
even if utilized solely to provide information for the other cosignatory. The court observed that, even if the appellees' contentions
about the Draft Convention were correct, the subsequent Revised
Commentary reinforced the Government's position." The court
therefore concluded that it was proper to use American adminis-

trative summonses solely to assist in the investigation of a potential Canadian tax liability in accordance with this tax treaty.3 8
The two courts that passed judgment on the instant case based
their adverse decisions on divergent rationales that in turn reflect
different policies. Since each opinion is adequately supported by
a logical legal analysis, it is each court's underlying policy consideration that merits inspection. The district court found the two
acts consistent based upon a literal reading of the provisions in
question. In accordance with the district court's line of thinking if
the treaty provisions were meant to have any different connotation, then the Treaty or the IRC could be altered through legislative channels. Consistent with this view, foreign corporations like
Westward should not be penalized nor should domestic corporations like Burbank and Bank of Tokyo be harrassed by procedures
which arise from an imprecise reading of the two acts. While the
ordinary meaning of the words employed is a factor in interpreting
treaties, however, the intent of the parties should first be determined and then should itself be the determining factor in settling
disputes like the instant case. Therefore strict construction of
treaty words should be avoided if it would be contrary to the parties' intentions. A treaty expands the scope of each nation's rights
and duties as it removes unwanted obstacles to international cooperation. This Treaty is the result of an attempt to make international intercourse more practicable by solving problems of double
taxation and fiscal evasion. The exchange of information provisions should be looked at as being a means to an end and must be
construed in a manner consistent with the purpose of the entire
Treaty. This was the approach taken by the appellate court. Although its holding and rationale are not challenged here, one might

question the comprehensiveness of the court's supportive analysis.

of the information system of the other Contracting State if it is wider than
its own system. 525 F.2d at 16, n.6.
The court interpreted "wider" differently than did the appellees and relied predominantly upon paragraphs 12 and 14 for its decision.
37. 525 F.2d at 16.
38. 525 F.2d at 16-17.
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For example, it seems that the controversy built around the OECD
Draft Convention and its Revised Commentary obscured the
threshold issue of the applicability of the Draft Convention to the
instant case. Whatever retroactive weight the Draft Convention
might have is undermined by the fact that this Treaty's unique
article XXI contains language that is conspicuously different
from the terms shared by comparable provisions in the Draft Convention and several other American tax treaties. 9 Similarly, the
court spent little time with the specific factors that have a bearing
on this Treaty and chose to rely predominantly upon general doctrines such as broad treaty construction and the lack of a reciprocity requirement between the parties. Instead of dismissing the
Treaty's practical construction as manifested by the Internal Revenue Manual, it might have examined the Treaty's legislative history and taken notice of the Acting Secretary of State's report with
respect to intended reciprocity." The Manual together with the
Secretary's report present a strong indication of the intent of the
cosignatories. It should not have been summarily discarded on the
basis of general principles of treaty construction. The exchange of
information articles in many American treaties are critical empowering provisions upon which the treaties rely and upon which there
has heretofore been no litigation.4 The court has now determined
that the reach of such provisions is as wide as the administrative
measures authorized to gather information for any domestic investigation.
John R. Hellinger
39. See notes 2, 35 supra; e.g., Income Tax Treaty with France, July 28, 1967,
[1968] 4 U.S.T. 5281, T.I.A.S. No. 6518, which has an exchange of information
provision (art. 26) virtually the same as that of the Draft Convention.
40. See note 26 supra.
41. Exchange of information provisions of American tax treaties have been
discussed. See, e.g., S. ROBERTS & W. WARREN, U.S. INCOME TAXATION OF FOREIGN
CORPORATIONS AND NONRESIDENT ALIENS P IX/16 (1971). However, the specific

issue presented in this case has not been previously addressed.

TREATY INTERPRETATION-WARSAW CONVENTION-

PASSEN-

GERS UNDERGOING SEARCH PREREQUISITE TO BOARDING ARE ENGAGED IN
OPERATIONS OF EMBARKING

Plaintiffs, passengers on defendant international airline,
brought an action under the Warsaw Convention to recover damages' for personal injuries suffered during an attack by "Black
September" terrorists on the transit lounge at Hellenikon Airport,
Athens, Greece. Plaintiffs had presented their tickets to defendant's checking desk on the upper level of the airport, had proceeded through passport and currency control, and had descended
to the lower-level lounge from which they could not leave without
again clearing passport and currency control on the upper level. At
the time of the attack they were lined up for a hand baggage and
personal search conducted by Greek police. Plaintiffs allege that
they were injured while engaged in the "operations of embarking,"
for which injuries article 172 of the Warsaw Convention makes the
carrier absolutely liable. Both parties moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability. Faced with the question of whether
"operations of embarking" in article 17 should encompass the
plaintiffs' actions, the district court outlined eleven steps essential

to the action of embarking.3 It held that plaintiffs, being in the
1. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, opened for signature October 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S.
No. 87, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter cited as Warsaw Convention]. The Convention was concluded at Warsaw, Poland. The official text is in French; the English
version is provided at 49 Stat. 3014.
2. Article 17 provides:
"The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the death
or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger if the accident which caused the damage so sustained took place on
board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or
disembarking." (emphasis supplied).
3. The court said the passengers "could not board the aircraft until they:
1. presented their tickets to TWA at the checking desk on the upper level;
2. obtained boarding passes from TWA;
3. obtained baggage checks from TWA;
4. obtained an assigned seat number from TWA;
5. passed through passport and currency control imposed by the Greek
Government;
6. submitted to a search of their persons for explosives and weapons by
Greek police;
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midst of these essential steps, were entitled to the protection of
absolute liability. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held, affirmed. When passengers scheduled
to depart on flights within the- Warsaw Convention's coverage
have entered an airport area reserved exclusively for them and are
in the process of undergoing a search prerequisite to boarding, the
airline on which they are ticketed is absolutely liable for any injuries incurred under the Warsaw Convention. Day v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975).
The Warsaw Convention, "the most widely adopted private law
theory in the history of mankind," 4 was designed to provide uniform rules on the transportation of goods and passengers in international air carriage.' The Convention is contractual in nature6
and therefore all carriage governed by the Convention rests on "the
consent of the carrier to transport the passenger. . . and the consent of the passenger . . . that the transport take place." 7 The

Convention is not meant to regulate the passenger-carrier relationship on an international basis.8 Instead, its purpose is to set forth
some uniform boundaries on the liability of carriers engaging in air
transportation among nations2 Chief among these boundaries is

the accident cost burden to be borne by the carriers"0 and the bases
7. submitted their carry-on baggage for similar inspection by Greek police;

8.
9.
10.
11.

walked through Gate 4 to Olympic's bus;
boarded the bus;
rode in the bus a distance of 100 yards; and
walked off the bus and onto the aircraft."

393 F. Supp. 217, 221 (1975).
4. Landry, Swift, Sure and Equitable Recovery-A Developing Concept in
InternationalAviation Law, 47 N.Y.S.B.J. 372, 373 (1975).
5. See generally D. GOEDHUIS, NATIONAL AI LEGISLATIONS AND THE WARSAW
CONVENTION (1937).
6. See discussion in Block v. CompagnieNationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323,
330-31 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968).

7. 386 F.2d at 334.
8. See Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1957). See
also Zousmer v. Canadian Pacific Air Lines, 307 F. Supp. 892 (S.D.N.Y. 1969);
Komlos v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 111 F. Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1952),
rev'd on other grounds, 209 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1953).
9. Orr, The Warsaw Convention, 31 VA. L. REv. 423, 426 (1945). See also 1 L.
KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW § 11.01 (rev. ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as
KREINDLER].

10. See Eck v. United Arab Airlines, 15 N.Y.2d 53, 203 N.E.2d 640, 255
N.Y.S.2d 249 (1964).
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for passenger rcovery. "1 Article 22 of the original 1929 Convention
limited the amount of damages recoverable by an injured passenger to $8,300; the original article 20(1) further provided the carrier
with a full defense if it could prove it had taken all necessary

measures to avoid the damage. "2 The United States, an adherent
to the Convention in 1934, gave formal notice of withdrawal in 1965
because of widespread belief that the recovery limits were inadequate to protect American foreign travelers.' 3 The United States
withdrew its denunciation in 1966, however, after virtually all international air carriers agreed to increase the limit of liability to
$75,000 and to waive the article 20(1) defense." Under this "Montreal Agreement,"" the carriers accepted absolute liability, provided the transportation was international in scope and began or
ended at a point in the United States." Soon after the Montreal
Agreement was accepted, the problem of injury to passengers from
actions outside the airline's control had developed into an important controversy. 7 Interpreting article 17 in particular, the courts
11. Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, 34 N.Y.2d 385, 314 N.E.2d 848, 358
N.Y.S.2d 97 (1974).
12. KREINDLER § 11.02. Article 20(1) provides, "The carrier shall not be liable
if he proves that he and his agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid
the damage or that it was impossible for him or them to take such measures."
13. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw
Convention, 80 HARv. L. REv. 497, 546 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Lowenfeld &
Mendelsohn].
14. The Warsaw Convention-Recent Developments and the Withdrawal of
the United States Denunciation, 32 J. AIR L. & CoM. 243, 248 (1966).
15. C.A.B. Order No. E-23680, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966). Procedurally, each
airline files a contract with the Civil Aeronautics Board stating that it will abide
by the Agreement's terms. Originally it was contemplated that the Convention
would be formally amended to include these terms but this has not happened.
See DEP'T STATE BULL. 923 (1965). In 1971 a protocol adopted at a diplomatic
conference in Guatemala proposed an increase in the liability ceiling to $100,000.
The United States has not yet become a signatory to this Guatemala Protocol.

See KREINDLER §§ 12B.01-12B.04; Mankiewicz, The 1971 Protocolof Guatemala
City, 38 J. AIR L. & COM. 519 (1972).
16. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, at 597.
17. The most serious threat to passenger safety was seen as hijacking. Two
multilateral treaties have been promulgated recently to discourage the rising tide
of hijacking incidents in international air travel. They are: (a) The Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, [1971]
2 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192 (effective Oct. 14, 1971) (This treaty imposes
an obligation on the parties to establish criminal jurisdiction over the offense,
without regard to the registration of the aircraft or the location of the act); (b)
The Montreal Convention for the Supression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety
of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, [1973] 1 U.S.T. 565, T.I.A.S. No. 7570 (effective
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were faced with "the inherent difficulty of freezing into words the
exact limitations of a law-[drawing] a line on one side of which
liability exists and is absent on the other." 8 Several American
opinions dealing 'ith injuries incurred in disembarking found that
liability ceased upon the passenger's arrival at certain geographical limits-a "safe point"-within the terminal. 9 A passenger injured by a fall in the baggage delivery and customs clearance area
was denied recovery on this basis in McDonald v. Air Canada,2"
even though she remained "in the status of a passenger of [the]
carrier while inside the building."'2' European courts have tended
to define the issue in similar terms. 22 A French court of appeals
reversed a Warsaw Convention-based damages judgment to a passenger injured while crossing the "customs garden" to the side of
the airport traffic apron. The court concluded that the customs
garden did not present "risks inherent in aeronautical operations. 12 3 More recently, significant support for a theory of geographical limits to liability was provided by the United States
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania in
Jan. 26, 1973) (This treaty contains the same provisions as does the Hague Convention, but applies them specifically to acts of sabotage, other acts of violence
against persons on board an aircraft, and the destruction of aircraft).
For a further discussion of the scope of this hijacking threat, see
Symposium-Skyjacking: Problems and PotentialSolutions, 18 VILL. L. REV. 985
(1973).

18. Sullivan, The Codification of Air Carrier Liability by International
Convention, 7 J. AIR L. & COM. 1, 19-20 (1936). The 1929 draft provision on
liability had defined air carriage as extending from the moment passengers,
goods, and baggage entered the airport of departure to the moment they exited
the airport of arrival. The delegates to the Convention conference rejected the
draft article, and it was split into two provisions. Article 18, relating to baggage
and goods, remained the same, but article 17, relating to passengers, extended
liability only to those accidents occurring on board the aircraft and during embarking and disembarking. Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, 396 F. Supp. 95,

100 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
19. See, e.g., Klein v. K.L.M. Royal Dutch Airlines, 46 A.2d 679, 360
N.Y.S.2d 60 (1974); Felismina v. Trans World Airlines, 13 Av. Cas. 17-145 (S.D.
N.Y. 1974). Neither court, however, defines "safe point" other than to note that
it is reached once the passenger descends from the plane and enters the terminal.
20. 439 F.2d 1402 (1st Cir. 1971).
21. 439 F.2d at 1405.
22. See, e.g., the judgment of the Court of Appeal of Berlin, reported in 2
SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT, AIR LAW 86 (Supp. 1975) [hereinafter cited as
SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT].

23. Mach6 v. Air France, Revue Francaise de Droit Aerien 228 (1966), as
reported in 33 J. AIR L. & COM. 207 (1967).
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Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, 4 decided four months after
the district court disposition of the instant case. The court examined in well-documented detail the evolution of article 17, from a
provision which imposed liability from the time passengers entered
the airport of departure until the time when they exited from the
airport of arrival, to its present status. Concluding that "operations of embarkment" defined "geographical limits rather than an
activity," 2 the court denied summary judgment on the issue of
liability to plaintiffs injured in the same terrorist attack in Hellenikon Airport. The court conceded that the analysis behind the
"steps" outlined in the district court disposition of the instant case
was sound; yet the result, the Pennsylvania court noted, extended
Warsaw Convention liability "far beyond anything that was within
the contemplation of the [signatories] .,""

In the instant case the court held that application of article 17
should be determined by reference to the activities of the passengers as they proceeded to departure. The court believed that the
language of article 17 neither expressly excluded events occurring
within the terminal, nor restricted embarkation procedures according to geographic limits. In this case the passengers had surrendered their tickets and had passed through passport control;
they were assembled in a restricted area; they had been directed
by an agent of the airline to line up to undergo a search prerequisite to boarding. The court found that these limitations on the
passengers' movements, preventing them from "roaming at will in
the terminal, 2' 7 placed them within the course of embarking.28 The

court also found that an expansive construction of the article followed the modem concept of an air carrier's responsibility for accident costs. Not only can airlines more effectively distribute the
financial burden of injuries, 9 the court said, but also charging the
24.

396 F. Supp. 95 (W.D. Pa. 1975).

25. 396 F. Supp. at 101.
26. 396 F. Supp. at 102.
27.

528 F.2d at 33.

28. The court emphasized the involvement of the airline's personnel in limiting the movements of passengers by distinguishing it from McDonald v. Air
Canada. Since the plaintiff in McDonald was standing near the baggage pickup
area after deplaning, she was "not acting. . . at the direction of the airlines. .."
or". . performing an act required for. . . disembarkation." 528 F.2d at 34, n.8.
29. One of the policies underlying the Convention is the redistribution of
accident costs to all passengers through insurance. In Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., the court found the airline liable for a passenger's bodily injury and
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airlines with this responsibility would encourage higher standards
of airport safety for passengers. From a practical perspective, the
court noted that denial of article 17 coverage to injuries such as
these would force passengers to seek redress in expensive foreign
litigation, thus precluding rapid recovery of damages." The court
concluded that a primary goal of the Warsaw Convention was protection of the passenger." The treaty created, the court declared,
"a system of liability rules that would cover all the hazards of air
travel.

' 32 The

court therefore found that adherence to an interpre-

tation of article 17 based on location rather than passenger activity, would frustrate the intent of the Convention's drafters to provide an instrument adaptable to the changing structure of international aviation.
The court has shifted the passenger-airline relationship from a
contractual one to a regulatory one not justified by the conditions
of international air travel. As a result of this decision, an airline is
absolutely liable under the Warsaw Convention for injury to a
passenger within the air terminal if the court can determine that
the passenger was in fact engaged in an activity required for boarding. This holding satisfies the needs presented by the bizarre set
of circumstances in the instant case. Taken one step further, however, it also means that an airline would be absolutely liable for a
passenger who, having had his ticket and passport checked, stumbles over a chair and injures himself. This broad interpretation of
article 17 ignores the extent to which the airline actually controls
passengers' activities. Few of the boarding procedures on international flights are initiated by the airline itself. Furthermore, unlike
a bus or railroad station, an air terminal is a public facility, usually
provided by a government entity for use by a number of carriers."
mental anguish because: (1) the carrier had a responsibility to avoid such incidents, since it physically controlled the planes; (2) the carrier was better able to
assess the risks of air travel and insure against them; and (3) it was able to

redistribute the costs of these steps. 351 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd 485
F.2d 1240 (1973). See also Rosman v. Trans World Airlines Inc., 34 N.Y.2d 385,
314 N.E.2d 848, 358 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1974); Krystal v. BOAC, 403 F.Supp. 1322
(D.C. Cal. 1975).

30. 528 F.2d at 34.
31. As support for its finding, the court listed, in a footnote, the opinions of a
variety of commentators. Ironically, the commentators agreed only that liability

attaches when the passenger is under the direct control of the airline. See 1
SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT, at

441-42.

32. 528 F.2d at 38.
33.

An exception might be those terminals constructed and operated solely by
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Restriction of boarding passengers in a large general-use lounge
may be a condition forced on the carrier by the terminal's layout.34
Also, customs and passport checks, prerequisites to international
travel, are functions solely of a state's police power. No international airline would be able to operate if it refused to acquiesce to
these official "steps." It would be more appropriate, then, to apply
a geographic analysis of liability, rather than an activity-oriented
analysis, to injuries within an air terminal. The "safe point"
theory, applied in Evangelinos and others, relies on the location of
the passenger within the building itself. Location is a primary
factor in the instant case. The terrorist attack was planned in secret and conducted in an area necessarily removed from the exclusive control of defendant's personnel because of the presence of the
"flight desks" of other airlines.n The passengers were preparing to
undergo search procedures required by the Greek police. They
could not physically commit themselves to the singular care of the
defendant until they passed the search area. The victims were
therefore beyond that stage where defendant could have effected
any significant protective measures, even if it had attempted
them. If absolute liability under the Convention is based on the
presumption that the carrier can control the risk to which passengers are exposed, then liability should not attach in the instant
case. It might be argued that the policy behind the decision was
to rest responsibility to guard against arbitrary destructive acts
upon those more financially able to bear the burden of protective
measures, the airlines. In effectuating such a policy, however, the
court has exposed carriers to a duty of unlimited proportion. Carriers may become insurers for passenger activities only minutely
related to air transportation. The geographic analysis would define
a carrier's responsibility to protect passengers in more feasible
one airline, which are often found in the largest international airports such as
Kennedy Airport in New York and Orly Airport in Paris.
34. See Sullivan, supra note 18, at 21. He suggests that the rule cannot be

stated "in terms of station gates or other aspects of the physical situation which
would not be everywhere duplicated."
35. In fact, the attack was made on this group of passengers by mistake. The
terrorists had meant to encounter a group of TWA passengers bound for Israel.
393 F. Supp. 217, 219.
36. See Heller, Notes on the Proposed Revision of Article 17 of the Warsaw
Convention, 20 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 142, 146-47 (1971). He proposes that article
17 be amended to apply only limited liability to operations of embarking and
disembarking; absolute liability would then attach only to injuries incurred on
board an aircraft in flight.
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terms. Further, it would both fulfill the policy of the Warsaw Convention to insure against the risks of international flight and avoid
penalizing carriers for capricious acts against which they could not
defend.
Elizabeth Graeme Browning

